Android Spy Camera System to Enhance Security Using Super Resolution Images

Abstract

. Studied the possibility of a "transplantation attack," in which malicious apps could take privacy-harming images to spy on users without the Android Application Programming Interface (API) auditing being aware of it, based on the observation that spy-on-users attack by calling Android API would be detected out. Typically, applications will need to make API calls to the Android Camera Service, a media server process, to snap a photo. To carry out a transplantation attack, a malicious program must copy the code responsible for taking photos from the media server process and then use these codes to take photos in its own address spaces, by passing the need for inter-process communication (IPC). This allows one to avoid being audited by the API. The results of studies show that the transplanting assault is real. The spy-on-user assault is also made more covert by the transplanting attack. Found that approximately half of the 69 Smartphones evaluated (produced by eight manufacturers) were vulnerable to the transplanting attack developed. In addition, the assault may hide from seven different antivirus scanners and the Android Device Administration APIs, which are utilized for enterprise-level mobile device administration. The transplanting attack prompted us to find a minor flaw in Android's security architecture and code using a super-resolution algorithm. The results show the scalability scores for Android versions